This paper examines whether viewers of the popular television show, American Idol, exhibit racial preferences. We find evidence on same-race preferences among black viewers only: when there are more black contestants in the show, more black viewers are tuned in to watch it. The result is robust after we account for the endogeneity problem regarding the contestants' racial composition, which arises due to the voting mechanism. Our point estimates tell that a 10 percentage point increase in the proportion of black contestants increases viewership ratings for black households by about 1.3 percentage points.
Introduction
There are a number of empirical studies across disciplines on racial preferences, particularly "same-race preferences" -one favors others of his or her own race. In an early study, Hraba and Grant (1970) found, replicating the wellknown doll experiment of Clark and Clark (1947) , that children prefer a doll of their own color. Same-race preferences are found in various interpersonal relationships, such as high-school friendship (Hallinan and Williams, 1989) , dating (Fisman et al., 2008) , and marriage (Wong, 2003) . Holzer and Ihlanfeldt (1998) found that the racial composition of customers affects the race of new hires since business owners accommodate consumers' racial preferences, which is consistent with Becker's (1971) prediction that consumer preferences may give rise to racial discrimination. This paper examines whether viewers of the television show, American Idol, exhibit same-race preferences. Looking at the television viewership ratings to test whether racial preferences exist is not a new empirical strategy. The idea is to look at "revealed preferences" rather than subjective responses. The previous studies consistently found that the racial composition of television appearances influences viewership ratings in various television programs (Myers, 2008; Aldrich et al., 2005; Kanzawa and Funk, 2001 ). The existence of racial preferences among television viewers shows not only cultural differences between races (Waldfogel, 2003) but also may yield unintended economic consequences for those who have stakes in the ratings (e.g., news anchors or professional sports players). Another important concern about racial preferences among viewers is that, if television program producers take viewers' preferences into account and accommodate their demand, minorities might be under-represented in those programs. This might have an impact on racial identity for the television generation.
Our main contribution to the literature is made by the novelty of our data and the unique format of American Idol. First, the earlier studies cannot test for existence of same-race preferences for each race separately because the aggregate data cannot identify whether the ratings are changed among whites or blacks, or both. In contrast, we use detailed ratings disaggregated by race. Same-race preferences do not necessarily exist for all races. In fact, such preferences may be stronger among black people since preferences may originate from blacks' minority status. Hraba and Grant's (1970) replication, in contrast to the earlier study by Clark and Clark (1947) , finds that black children prefer dark-skin dolls. They argue that black children have recently become more proud of their race. This is in harmony with the trend that Fryer and Levitt (2004) found about how black people name their children. They attribute the increasing popularity of distinctively black first names during the early 1970s to the Black Power movement and enhanced racial identity among blacks. McCormick and Tollison (2001) also found that black people's own-race preferences exist only in black-dominant residential areas. Blacks in those areas are likely to have stronger racial identity than blacks in white areas or mixed-race areas.
Second, following the previous studies, we examine how the racial composition of those who appear on television, i.e., the proportion of black singers in American Idol, affects the program's viewership ratings. An econometric problem is that the racial composition of contestants is potentially endogenous because it is determined by viewers' public voting. It is therefore possible that viewers choose not only whether they will watch the show, but also decide who will appear in the next show. Although it gives rise to the endogeneity problem, the show's unique format provides us with an opportunity to look at viewers' racial preferences disentangled from confounding factors such as television program producers' racial preferences or incentives to maximize the viewership ratings. In addition, the same feature of the show allows us to examine revealed racial preferences in a passive form (television watching) as well as in an active form (voting) at the same time within one context.
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To address the endogeneity problem, we use the instrumental variable (IV) estimation method. Our IV is the racial composition of viewers for the previous week's show (as will be explained, we use two different measures). The IV is motivated by the hypothesis that viewers with same-race preferences would vote for contestants of their own race. The validity condition is that the instrumental variable is uncorrelated with the unobservable component of the current week's viewing tendency. We will discuss the validity condition in detail in Section 3. We also use the interaction between the IV and the inverse of number of contestants as an additional IV. The marginal effect of the racial composition of viewers on the racial composition of contestants should be proportionate to the inverse of total number of contestants since only one contestant is voted off every week. After resolving the endogeneity problem, we find that a 10 percentage point increase in the proportion of black contestants increases the black-household ratings by about 1.3 percentage points.
1 There are some studies that found racial preferences in voting behaviors. Blacks are not only more likely to participate in voting when there is a black candidate, but also support candidates of their own race. Washington (2006) find that each black democrat candidate increases the voter turnout rate by 2 percentage points. Terkildsen (1993) conducted a field experiment where a random sample of adults was asked to evaluate fictitious candidates for governor with different skin colors, and found that white voters discriminate against black candidates.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic set-up of American Idol and presents our data. Section 3 presents a statistical model of television viewers' behavior, which embeds the hypothesis of same-race preferences and derives a simple equation for TV viewing tendency. Section 4 discusses our empirical findings. The endogeneity of the racial composition of contestants is tested and resolved by the two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation method. Section 5 concludes. The program is very unusual in that it is equally popular among blacks and whites (Fisman et al., 2008) .
Show Format and Data
The format of the show is simple. Twelve finalists (ten in Season 1), equally divided between men and women, are selected from thousands of applicants through early auditions and semifinals. Finalists are required to perform live songs from a common weekly theme. A common theme is given to ensure that contestants be judged based on performance, not on their selection of genre or style.
The show is nationally televised twice a week, on Tuesday and Wednesday. Immediately after each Tuesday show, people can vote for their favorite singer by sending text messages or by calling a toll-free number assigned to the contestant. They are allowed to vote as many times as they like for any number of contestants within a two hour vote window. During the following night's (Wednesday) show, it is announced which contestant received the least number of votes.
2 That person is permanently eliminated from the contest. Thus, the racial composition of contestants in any given week is determined by the previous week's vote and does not vary within a week. This is important since the show format motivates the IVs to deal with the endogeneity of the proportion of black contestants.
Our primary data are collected and provided by the Nielsen Media Research (NMR). They measure the nationwide television viewership ratings by an electronic measurement system called the Nielsen People Meter. These machines are placed in a nationally representative sample of about 5,000 households, recording what program is being tuned into. The data are available for all seven seasons including 144 individual shows.
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The raw data contain information on the ratings of all households and those of black households. Thus, we can compute the ratings for non-black households. We believe that most non-black households are white because the show is not so popular among Hispanic people. The NMR provides the ratings for Hispanic households, but American Idol has never been ranked in the top 10 programs for Hispanics.
4 The show is, on the other hand, very popular among black people. The average rating for black households is 16.9%, while the rating for non-black households is 13.6%. Thus, the proportion of viewers who are black is, on average, about 15%. Table 1 summarizes the ratings when the proportion of black contestants is higher or lower than its median, 1/3. When there are relatively more black contestants, the ratings for black households are relatively higher and, on the other hand, those for non-black households are slightly lower. The gaps are statistically significant at any standard significance level. This is consistent with the existence of same-race preferences. Figure 1 confirms the same pattern: the ratings for one race and the proportion of contestants of the same race are positively correlated. A simple linear regression shows that a 10 percentage point increase in the proportion increases the ratings by 1.1, and, in other words, attracts an additional 1.1% of black television households. For non-black households, the ratings were significantly lower in Season 1 than the other seasons. After excluding Season 1 (Figure 1 .C), a 10 percentage point increase in the proportion of black contestants decreases the ratings by 0.6.
Before proceeding to regression analysis, it is worthwhile to note that simple cross-sectional relationships found in Figure 1 allude the existence of samerace preferences. However, the observed relationships might arise either a) because relatively more black contestants draw more black viewers and less non-black viewers, or b) because a higher proportion of black viewers or a lower proportion of non-black viewers may keep more black contestants in the show since viewers with same-race preferences vote for their favorite contestants. To estimate the causal effects of contestants' racial composition on the viewership ratings, one needs to resolve the simultaneity problem.
Estimation

Viewing Tendency Equation
We consider an estimable structural model of viewership to examine how the racial composition of contestants affects households' television viewing behavior. Following Aldrich et al. (2005) and Waldfogel (2003), we assume the utility of household i of race r (r = b, w) watching show t as a linear function:
where the last two terms, u rt and ε irt , represent unobservable preferences at the racial-group level and at the household level, respectively. As mentioned, we focus on two racial groups for which the ratings data are available: black (r = b) and non-black (or white, r = w) groups. The vector X t includes the show's various characteristics, and τ 1r represents race-specific season dummies. 5 The variable R t is our key variable, the proportion of black contestants. If there were same-race preferences, the coefficient for the proportion of black contestants should be positive for black households and negative for non-black households. This is a testable hypothesis since we have the ratings data for each race separately.
Assuming that ε irt 's are iid logistic and that the utility of not watching is normalized to zero, the share of households watching the show among all households of the same race (the Nielsen ratings) is:
Taking the log of the ratio of the share choosing to watch over the share choosing not to watch yields the following estimable equation:
where the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the ratio of viewing households to non-viewing households. Following Waldfogel (2003), we term this the "viewing tendency." Lastly, we include the lagged value of the dependent variable (i.e., the previous week's viewing tendency) as a control variable to account for the possibility that there exists habit formation in television watching. As we will explain shortly, controlling for the lagged term is crucial for the IV estimation. Thus, our final specification is:
where ρ captures persistence in the viewing tendency.
Endogeneity of the Racial Composition of Contestants
A potential econometric problem with estimating the viewing tendency equation by OLS is the endogeneity of the proportion of black contestants. In Equation (4), we want to estimate the causal effect of the race of contestants on the viewing tendency. But causality may run in the opposite direction. Viewers vote on who should remain in the next week's show and, therefore, decide the proportion of black contestants. We resolve the problem by the IV estimation method. We specify the first-stage equation for the proportion of black contestants:
where the vector X t includes the show characteristics and τ 2 represents season dummies. Note that there are two IVs for R t : Z t and Z t × 1 bt+wt . Below we will explain the variables and their relevance and validity conditions. First, the main IV, Z t , is the log ratio of black viewing tendency to nonblack viewing tendency for the previous week's Tuesday show. The rationale is that the racial composition of contestants is determined by the previous week's public voting, which begins immediately after the Tuesday show and ends after only two hours. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that most voters are the Tuesday show's viewers.
6 And it is also reasonable to assume that viewers who prefer to watch contestants of their own race should vote for such contestants. As long as the variable Z t proxies the ratio of black voters to non-black voters, the IV should be relevant. Indeed, the IV turns out to be significant in the first-stage regression.
We test this assumption in Table 2 by a placebo test using Wednesday viewers as potential voters.
7 There are two potential problems with the proxy variable. First, not all viewers participate in voting. In fact, those who do not watch the show can vote. But we expect that the the racial ratio of viewers and that of voters are strongly and positively correlated. Second, since one is allowed to vote as many times as he or she likes, what we need is the count of Now we check the validity condition, Cov(Z t , u rt ) = 0. Note that the IV can be written as:
Then, the validity condition actually requires
This follows from the fact that X t−1 and (τ 1b − τ 1w ) are exogenous and that ξ t−1 in R t−1 is only a projection error in the first-stage regression, which is uncorrelated with u rt . Furthermore, if u rt is not autocorrelated (given the lagged dependent variable in Equation (4)), the condition is simply
In other words, the IV is valid if the unobserved component of the current week's viewing tendency of a race (r) is uncorrelated with the unobserved component of the previous week's viewing tendency of the opposite race (−r). The validity condition is likely to be satisfied except for certain particular cases. For example, suppose that black viewers might respond more quickly to some news related the show (unobserved to the econometrician) than nonblack viewers do. But, assume that viewers of both races similarly react to the news: if the news attracted more black viewers, it would also attract more non-black viewers and vice versa. In this case, our IV estimates of β b1 and β w1 will be biased toward zero.
8 For both races, our estimates for the effects of contestants' racial composition on the viewing tendency should be the lower bounds in the absolute term.
votes (not voters). But the data on votes are not available.
8 For non-black viewers, Cov(Z t , u wt ) = Cov(u b,t−1 −u w,t−1 , u wt ) = Cov(u b,t−1 , u wt ) > 0. The IV estimate will be overestimated and biased toward zero if the true β w1 < 0. Similarly, for black viewers, Cov(Z t , u bjt ) = Cov(u b,t−1 − u w,t−1 , u bt ) = −Cov(u w,t−1 , u bt ) < 0. The IV estimate will be underestimated and biased toward zero if the true β b1 > 0. Also, note that if u rt is positively autocorrelated, the bias term could be cancelled out because Cov(u b,t−1 − u w,t−1 , u rt ) = Cov(u b,t−1 , u rt ) − Cov(u w,t−1 , u rt ) where the two covariances are positive.
We include, as an additional IV, the interaction term between Z t , and the inverse of the number of remaining contestants. The idea is that since only one contestant is voted off every week, the marginal impact of the voting outcome on the racial composition of contestants varies over weeks depending on the number of contestants. Let b t−1 /(b t−1 + w t−1 ) denote the proportion of black contestants in the previous week (b t−1 is the number of black contestants, and w t−1 is the number of non-black contestants). If a black contestant is voted off in the previous week (it is announced on Wednesday), then the proportion of black contestants in the current week (both Tuesday and Wednesday) becomes (b t−1 − 1)/(b t−1 − 1 + w t−1 ). On the other hand, if a non-black contestant is voted off, the proportion becomes b t−1 /(b t−1 + w t−1 − 1). The differential in the proportion depending on which race is voted off is 1/(b t−1 − 1 + w t−1 ) = 1/(b t + w t ), which is the inverse of the number of surviving contestants.
For robustness, we also use the share of black viewing households as an alternative main IV. The new IV is intuitively more appealing in that it is interpretable as the share of potential black voters. The disadvantage of this IV is that it requires a stronger assumption for the validity condition. The alternative IV is formally V b,t−1 /(V b,t−1 +V w,t−1 ) where V represents the number of viewers. This can be rewritten in terms of the ratings as the following:
where N is the number of television-viewing households, which is constant within seasons. The validity condition requires that, due to the nonlinearity, the error term, u rt , should be independent of s −r,t−1 conditional on control variables. This is a strong assumption, but we expect that the results will be similar since both variables for Z t are strongly correlated.
Voting Outcome Equation
Our IVs are motivated by the fact that the racial composition of viewers determines the race of the contestant who is voted off. We may check the idea by estimating a simple model of racial voting in which the race of the contestant who is voted off depends on the racial composition of voters. We estimate a Probit model where the dependent variable is whether a black contestant is voted off. The key independent variable is the IV, Z t as we defined above. The proportion of black contestants is included as a control variable because a black is more likely to be eliminated when there are more blacks. If all contestants were equally talented and if voters had no racial preferences, the voting outcome should have been decided randomly and the probability in which a black contestant is eliminated should have been equal to the proportion of blacks. The marginal effect of the proportion of black contestants should equal one, while the coefficient for the racial composition of viewers should be zero.
9 Table 2 shows the results. The sample is restricted to those shows in which at least one black contestant remains. We find that the racial composition of viewers affects the probability with which a black contestant is voted off.
10 In Column (1), an increase in the log viewing tendency ratio by 0.1 (the sample average of weekly fluctuations in the ratio) decreases the probability of a black contestant's being voted off by about 15 percentage points. In Column (2), an increase of the share of black viewers by 1 percentage point decreases the probability by 14 percentage points.
We also find that, holding other things constant, black contestants are disproportionately more likely to be voted off. The marginal effect of black contestants' proportion is statistically different from one. It is about 5 times larger than what it would be under the hypothesis of race-blind random voting. This might reflect the fact that a majority of viewers are white. If they have same-race preferences, black contestants should be overall disadvantaged. Alternatively, this might be because black contestants, on average, perform less well or they are less popular.
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We assume that viewers of Tuesday shows represent voters. We can check this assumption using a placebo test. In Columns (3) and (4), we estimate the same Probit model by using Wednesday viewers as a placebo test. We find no significant effect from the racial composition of Wednesday viewers on the voting outcome. This suggests that most voters are likely to be Tuesday viewers given the short-time window of voting.
One might wonder whether the effect of the racial composition of viewers on the voting outcome reflects voters' racial preferences. The main concern here is that the quality of contestants is an omitted variable. For example, 10 The finding is in contrast with the previous findings from another television show Weakest Link (Levitt 2004 , Antonovics et al. 2005 where they find no evidence for raciallydiscriminatory voting behavior. There are at least two possible explanations. First, the main difference between American Idol and Weakest Link, which derives the contrasting results, is anonymity. In the latter show who voted against whom is completely revealed, so a stigma attached to racist views would affect voting decision. As Levitt (2004) explains, "contestants may shy away from targeting Blacks on a nationally televised program." On the other hand, in American Idol, voters are free to reveal their true preferences under anonymity. Second, contestants in Weakest Link vote in order to maximize their own expected prize, while voters for American Idol do not have such a direct pecuniary incentive. Thus those in the first show, even if they had racial preferences, should face a trade-off between money and their preferences for the race of their competitors, while American Idol voters express their preferences virtually at no cost.
11 The season fixed effects turn out to be significant. The estimates show that black contestants are even more likely to be voted off in Season 1 and 5 compared to the other seasons. One possible explanation is that black contestants in Season 1 and 5 had particularly lower quality performances or were less popular. Indeed, in the two seasons, no black contestant made the top 3 finalists. However, the results are hard to interpret since the fixed effects capture any season-specific unobservable differences.
suppose that there is a segment of black viewers who watch the show only if there are high-quality black contestants. In this case, an increase in black contestants' average quality should not only attract more black viewers, but also lower the probability in which black contestants are voted off.
12 The particular segment of viewers may give rise to a spurious relationship between viewers' racial composition and the voting outcome. The placebo test results, however, address this concern. If the above argument were true, we should have found a similar spurious relationship for Wednesday viewers. The existence of a significant effect only for Tuesday viewers (who are likely to be voters) indicates that the effect reflects voters' preferences. Table 3 shows the viewing-tendency equation (Equation (4)) estimation results for non-black and black households. The standard errors are adjusted for clustering by weeks, since the ratings might be correlated on the unobservables between Tuesday and Wednesday shows within weeks. Columns (1) and (2) show the results for non-black households. Columns (3) and (4) show the results for black households. There are two sets of results for each racial group using different instruments.
Empirical Findings
We present only the estimates for the IVs from the first-stage regression.
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We find that a higher share of black viewers in the previous week's Tuesday show increases the proportion of black contestants in the current week. This is consistent with our expectation based on the voting model that we estimated in the previous section. The results are similar with alternative IVs. The estimation results are slightly stronger when we use the alternative IV. The interaction term between the proportion and the inverse of total number of contestants turns out to be significant and positive. Also, the test of overidentifying restrictions cannot reject the validity of the IVs. The marginal impact of the proportion of black contestants is larger when there are fewer remaining contestants. A 1 percentage point increase in the share of black households will increase the proportion of black contestants by 4.3 percentage points when there are six contestants. The IVs are significant in the first-stage equation accounting for about 20% of the R squared. The F-statistic is greater than 10.
The second-stage regression results show that the racial composition of contestants significantly changes the viewership ratings of black households. We recover the marginal effect on the ratings with respect to the proportion of black contestants using the following formula:
(9) For black households, at the average ratings (0.169), the marginal effect is β b1 * (1−0.169) * 0.169 = 0.119 or 0.131. That is, a 10 percentage point increase in the proportion of black contestants raises the ratings by 1.2-1.3 percentage points. This amounts to 177,000 black households in 2008. For example, suppose that there is one black contestant among the top 3 finalists, and he or she advances to the final two. This transition implies a 16.7 percentage point increase in the proportion of black contestants. This will raise the black ratings by 2 to 2.2 percentage points, or about 300,000 additional households. If there is no significant change in the non-black household ratings, this increases the total ratings by about 0.3 percentage point. It is interesting to compare our estimate with that of Kanzawa and Funk (2001) . They found that an additional white player (a 16.7% increase in the proportion of white players), who is a minority in the sport, increases the ratings by 0.54 percentage point.
We found a significant effect of the racial composition of contestants on black-household ratings while there is no significant impact on non-black ratings. This is an interesting, but not surprising, finding. Indeed some previous studies found that same-race preferences only exist among black or minority people. McCrary (1993) found that black listeners' preference ratings for taped music examples differ by performers' race while non-black listeners' ratings do not. Saha et al. (2000) found that minority patients prefer to choose physicians of their own race. McCormick and Tollison (2001) , using the data on team racial composition and attendance for professional basketball, found that black fans have a preference for black players, while there is no strong evidence on same-race preference among white fans.
Although the existence of same-race preferences is a simple explanation for our findings, there are still other possible explanations. For example, one may think that black contestants are, on average, more talented than white contestants and that black viewers are drawn to talent.
14 If this is true, then when there are more black contestants (i.e., more talented singers), more black viewers watch the show. On the other hand, this argument requires that nonblack viewers do not care about talent as much as black viewers do. This is also a strong assumption. However, this concern reminds us of an important challenge to identifying discrimination: that one needs a good measure of productivity (or talent) or a rich set of control variables.
It is an interesting question why same-race preferences exist among blacks. In this paper, we discuss two reasons. First, the existence of same-race preferences among black viewers for this particular program might be a consequence of under-representation of minority people on television (Greenberg et al., 2002) . If this is the case, what we found is black viewers' tastes for diversity rather than same-race preferences. That is, black viewers like to watch the program when there are more black contestants, or like to keep more blacks on the show while they also watch other programs where white appearances dominate. For minority viewers, it is difficult to disentangle same-race preferences from preferences for diversity or a balanced mix of races. On the other hand, white viewers might not be concerned about the racial composition of television appearances because their same-race preferences are satisfied by watching other white-dominant programs, or they might even like to watch blacks in the program if their tastes for diversity are sufficiently strong.
Second, our finding is also consistent with a strong racial identity among blacks. As discussed earlier, there is evidence that blacks have a stronger group identity than other races. A higher level of racial self-esteem might make blacks prefer to watch more television appearances from their own group and, furthermore, to see them winning the contest. Our finding of samerace preferences only among blacks makes sense in that own-race preferences historically resulted from black people's minority status.
Conclusions
Normatively, the contestants on American Idol should be judged solely based on talent and performance on stage, independently of their race. The show host, Ryan Seacrest, said "America, don't forget you have to vote for the talent" on the same day when Elton John criticized the show: "The three young people I was really impressed with -and they just happened to be black, young female singers -all seem to be landing in the bottom three" (Fox News, April 28, 2004) . The data are suggestive of the existence of same-race preferences among viewers (who are potential voters).
There are two caveats to our study. First, American Idol viewers are not representative of the general population. Since its start, the show has almost always been the most watched program in the U.S. In 2008, more than 31 million people watched the season finale. Nevertheless, those viewers (particularly, those who participate in voting) are more likely to be teenagers and female. Second, it is still questionable whether these preferences, revealed by television viewing behaviors, translate into racial discrimination in the labor markets. One may argue that in the entertainment industry, talent is indistinguishable from appearance, including skin color. Whether racial disparate treatment of celebrities (actors or professional sports players) by fans is a social problem that we should fix is indeed a tricky question. It is, on the other hand, true that we have not found any reasonable cause but pure preferences for certain social problems like hate crimes and taboos against interracial relationships. The current study provides empirical evidence that viewers of the most popular show in the U.S. have racial preferences. More studies are needed to assess the relationships between racial preferences and discrimination in various contexts.
